Title

Predatory States and Failing States: An Agency Perspective

Author(s)

Avinash Dixit Avinash Dixit (Princeton University)

Abstract

In any non-trivial state, policies decided at the top levels of government are administered by middle-level bureaucrats. I examine whether this agency problem can contribute to explaining state failure in matters of provision of public goods. I find some theoretical arguments to support the view that failure is more likely in states whose top rulers have predatory motives. When the bureaucrats' cost of providing the public good is their private information, rulers must give them incentive rents to achieve truthful revelation. Predatory rulers are less willing to part with such rents; therefore they tolerate more downward distortion in the provision of public goods to reduce the required rent-sharing. When the bureaucrats' actions are also unobservable, there is a synergistic interaction between more benevolent rulers and more caring or professional bureaucrats. However, these effects manifest themselves differently and to different degrees under different conditions of information. Therefore precise explanations or predictions in individual instances require context-specific analyses.

Creation Date

2006-06

Section URL ID

CEPS

Paper Number

131

URL

https://gceps.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/131dixit.pdf

File Function

Jel

H41, D73

Keyword(s)

Suppress

false

Series

3