- Title
- Seniority and Distribution in a Two-Worker Trade Union
- Author(s)
- Peter Kuhn Peter Kuhn (University of Western Ontario)
- Jacques Robert Jacques Robert (SSHRC)
- Abstract
- Unlike existing models which rely heavily on assumptions regarding unions' distributional preferences, we present a very simple model in which union seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions' optimal seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies that affect the relative wellbeing of different union members.
- Creation Date
- 1988-07
- Section URL ID
- IRS
- Paper Number
- 235
- URL
- https://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp013r074t956/1/235.pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- D86
- Keyword(s)
- unions, seniority, wages, layoffs,
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 1