Title
Money (Not) to Burn: Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Crop Residue Burning
Author(s)
B. Kelsey Jack B. Jack (University of California at Santa Barbara)
Seema Jayachandran Seema Jayachandran (Princeton University)
Namrata Kala Namrata Kala (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Rohini Pande Rohini Pande (Yale University)
Abstract
We test the effectiveness of payments for ecosystem services (PES) in reducing crop residue burning, which contributes significantly to India’s poor air quality. Standard PES contracts pay a monetary reward after verification that the participant has met a pro-environment condition (clearing agricultural fields without burning). We randomize paying a portion of the money upfront and unconditionally to address liquidity constraints and farmer distrust, which may undermine the standard contract’s effectiveness. Despite providing a lower reward for compliance, contracts with partial upfront payment increase compliance by 10 percentage points, which is corroborated with satellite-based burning measurements. The cost per life saved using this strategy is $4400. In contrast, standard PES has no effect on burning; the payments made are entirely inframarginal.
Creation Date
2023-08
Section URL ID
Paper Number
2023-14
URL
https://seemajayachandran.com/money_not_to_burn.pdf
File Function
Jel
O13, Q01, Q56
Keyword(s)
India, Life Expectancy, Payments for Ecosystem Services, PES
Suppress
false
Series
13