Title

Rules and Commitment in Communications: An Experimental Analysis

Author(s)

Guillaume R. Fréchette Guillaume Fréchette (New York University)

Alessandro Lizzeri Alessandro Lizzeri (New York University)

Jacopo Perego Jacopo Perego (Columbia University)

Abstract

We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which determine whether or not information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion. Our model predicts that commitment has opposite effects on information transmission under the two alternative rules. We leverage these contrasting forces to experimentally establish that subjects react to commitment in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. Quantitatively, not all subjects behave as predicted. We show that a form of commitment blindness leads some senders to overcommunicate when information is verifiable and undercommunicate when it is not. This generates an unpredicted gap in information transmission across the two rules, suggesting a novel role for verifiable information in practice.

Creation Date

2020-06

Section URL ID

Paper Number

2020-76

URL

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KpXF6BPIVkbuu30b4s3rgSxbJ7XFVwCV/view

File Function

Jel

C92, D83, D82, D91

Keyword(s)

Commitment, Communication, Information, Rules

Suppress

false

Series

13