Title
Amendment Voting with Incomplete Preferences
Author(s)
Xiaosheng Mu Xiaosheng Mu (Columbia University)
Abstract
We study the outcome of the amendment voting procedure based on a potentially incomplete preference relation. A decision-maker evaluates candidates in a list and iteratively updates her choice by comparing the status-quo to the next candidate. She favors the status-quo when the two candidates are incomparable according to her un-derlying preference. Developing a revealed preference approach; we characterize all choice functions that can arise from such a procedure and discuss to what extent the underlying preference can be identified from observed choices.
Creation Date
2019-01
Section URL ID
Paper Number
2019-29
URL
https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/305af47b-841e-4711-82a0-54c0ce9bc8fe/Amendment_voting.pdf
File Function
Jel
D11
Keyword(s)
Amendment voting; Choice from lists; Status-quo bias; Revealed-preference
Suppress
false
Series
13