Title

Costly Inspection and Money Burning in Internal Capital Markets

Author(s)

Rohit Patel Rohit Patel (Northwestern University)

Can Urgun Can Urgun (Princeton University)

Abstract

Bureaucracy and influence activities consume a great deal of managers’ time and effort in an organization. These activities are surplus destroying in the sense that they produce no direct output or information. This paper suggests a positive role for these activities. We develop a model for allocation in internal capital markets that takes a mechanism design perspective and incorporates both costly inspection and money burning (e.g. bureaucracy, influence activities) as tools for the headquarters to pursue optimal allocations. We find that the optimal mechanism deploys both the instruments of costly inspection and money burning, often at the same time on an agent.

Creation Date

2021-08

Section URL ID

Paper Number

2021-29

URL

https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/inspectionmodelshort.pdf

File Function

Jel

C72, D73, G31

Keyword(s)

costly verification, money burning, capital budgeting, investment, bureaucracy, influence activities

Suppress

false

Series

13