Title

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Author(s)

Dirk Bergemann Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Abstract

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Creation Date

2017-02

Section URL ID

Paper Number

089_2017

URL

http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/wp089_2017_Bergemann-Morris_Information-Design.pdf

File Function

Jel

C72, D82, D83

Keyword(s)

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete informa- tion, robust predictions, information structure

Suppress

false

Series

10