Title

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Author(s)

Dirk Bergemann Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Abstract

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by actions sets and payoff functions, and an information structure. We identify a partial order on many player information structures (individual sufficiency) under which more information shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Creation Date

2013-09

Section URL ID

Paper Number

054-2013

URL

http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp054_2013-revised-19Oct14_Bergemann_Morris_The-Comparison-of-Information-Structures-in-Games.pdf

File Function

Jel

C72, D82, D83

Keyword(s)

Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, su¢ ciency, Blackwell ordering

Suppress

false

Series

10