Title

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Author(s)

Dirk Bergemann Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Satoru Takahashi Satoru Takahashi (Princeton University)

Abstract

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between payoff types and belief types and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.

Creation Date

2012-01

Section URL ID

ET

Paper Number

wp030_2012_Bergemann_Morris_Takahashi.pdf

URL

http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000427.pdf

File Function

Jel

C79, D82

Keyword(s)

Mechanism Design, Robust Mechanism Design, Efficient Auctions, Inter- depedent Types, Partial Implementation, Full Implementation

Suppress

false

Series

10