- Title
- Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information
- Author(s)
- Dirk Bergemann Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)
- Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
- Abstract
- We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
- Creation Date
- 2011-10
- Section URL ID
- ET
- Paper Number
- 024_2011
- URL
- http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000265.pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- C72, D82, D83
- Keyword(s)
- Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 10