- Title
- Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs
- Author(s)
- Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)
- Satoru Takahashi Satoru Takahashi (Princeton University)
- Olivier Tercieux Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics)
- Abstract
- An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable. We also investigate how permissive robust rationalizability becomes if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs.
- Creation Date
- 2011-06
- Section URL ID
- ET
- Paper Number
- wp017_2011_Morris_Takahashi_Tercieux.pdf
- URL
- http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp017_2011_Morris_Takahashi_Tercieux.pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- C72, D82
- Keyword(s)
- equilibrium selection; supermodular game; incomplete information; robustness; contagion; global game
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 10