- Title
- On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games
- Author(s)
- Daisuke Oyama Daisuke Oyama (University of Tokyo)
- Satoru Takahashi Satoru Takahashi (Princeton University)
- Abstract
- This note demonstrates that symmetric 3 x 3 supermodular games may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in these games is known to be independent of the noise structure, our result implies that a noise-independent selection in global games may not be a robust equilibrium.
- Creation Date
- 2011-05
- Section URL ID
- ET
- Paper Number
- wp015_2011_Takahashi_Oyama.pdf
- URL
- http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp015_2011_Takahashi_Oyama.pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- C72, D82
- Keyword(s)
- equilibrium selection; supermodular game; incomplete information; robustness; contagion; global game
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 10