- Title
- Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
- Author(s)
- Takuo Sugaya Takuo Sugaya (Princeton University)
- Abstract
- We show that the folk theorm with individually rational payoffs defined by pure strategies generically holds for a general N-player repeated game with private monitoring when the number of each player's signals is sufficiently large. No cheap talk communication device or public randomization device is necessary.
- Creation Date
- 2011-02
- Section URL ID
- ET
- Paper Number
- wp012.pdf
- URL
- http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp011_2011.pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- C72, C73, D82
- Keyword(s)
- repeated game, folk theorm, private monitoring
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 10