Title

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Author(s)

Dirk Bergemann Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Satoru Takahashi Satoru Takahashi (Princeton University)

Abstract

A universal type space of inderdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from high-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistuishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to laternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.

Creation Date

2011-02

Section URL ID

ET

Paper Number

wp011_2011.pdf

URL

http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp008_2014-revised_Bergemann_Morris_Takahashi_Interdependent-Preferences-and-Strategic-Distinguishability.pdf

File Function

Jel

C79, D82, D83

Keyword(s)

interdependent prefereences, higher-order preference hierarchy, universal type space, strategic distinguishability

Suppress

false

Series

10