Title

Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited

Author(s)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Satoru Takahashi Satoru Takahashi (Princeton University)

Abstract

In conventional epistemic analysis of solution concepts in complete information games, complete information is implicitly interpreted to mean common certainty of (i) a mapping from action profiles to outcomes; (ii) players' (unconditional) preferences over outcomes; and (iii) players' preferences over outcomes conditional on others' actions. We characterize a new solution concept preference-correlated rationalizability that captures common certainty of (i) and (ii) but not (iii). We show that it is badly behaved, with failures of upper hemicontinuity giving rise to counter-intuitive results. We discuss restrictions that restore well-behaved results.

Creation Date

2011-02

Section URL ID

ET

Paper Number

wp010.pdf

URL

http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp010.pdf

File Function

Jel

C010, C700, D010

Keyword(s)

games, game theory, preferences, information

Suppress

false

Series

10