- Title
- Direct Implementation with Minimally Honest Individuals
- Author(s)
- Juan M. Ortner Juan Ortner (Princeton University)
- Abstract
- I consider a standard implementation problem under complete information when agents have a minimal degree of honesty. In particular, I assume that agents are white lie averse: they strictly prefer to tell the truth whenever lying has no effect on their material payoff. I show that if there are at least five agents who are all white lie averse and if I impose either of two refinements of Nash equilibrium, then a simple direct mechanism fully implements any social choice function.
- Creation Date
- 2010-12
- Section URL ID
- ET
- Paper Number
- wp009.pdf
- URL
- https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.431.6797&rep=rep1&type=pdf
- File Function
- Jel
- C72, C73, D71, D78
- Keyword(s)
- Implementation, Mechanism design, White lie aversion
- Suppress
- false
- Series
- 10