Title

The Robustness of Robust Implementation

Author(s)

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn (Princeton University)

Stephen Morris Stephen Morris (Princeton University)

Abstract

We show that a mechanism that robustly implements optimal outcomes in a one-dimensional supermodular environment continues to robustly implement e-optimal outcomes in all close-by environments. Robust implementation of e-outcomes is thus robust to small perturbations of the environment. This is in contrast to ex-post implementation which is not robust in this sense as only trivial social choice functions are ex-post implementable in generic environments.

Creation Date

2010-06

Section URL ID

ET

Paper Number

me001.pdf

URL

https://economics.mit.edu/files/17346

File Function

Jel

E200, C010, D400, H300, O400

Keyword(s)

robust implementation, social choice,

Suppress

false

Series

10