Title
Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement
Author(s)
Orley C. Ashenfelter Orley Ashenfelter (Princeton University)
Daniel Hosken Daniel Hosken (Federal Trade Commission)
Matthew Weinberg Matthew Weinberg (Federal Trade Commission)
Abstract
The challenge of effective merger enforcement is tremendous. U.S. antitrust agencies must, by statute, quickly forecast the competitive effects of mergers that occur in virtually every sector of the economy to determine if mergers can proceed. Surprisingly, given the complexity of the regulators task, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on the effects of mergers to guide regulators. This paper describes the necessity of retrospective analysis of past mergers in building an empirical basis for antitrust enforcement, and provides guidance on the key measurement issues researchers confront in estimating the price effects of mergers. We also describe how evidence from merger retrospectives can be used to evaluate the economic models used to predict the competitive effects of mergers.
Creation Date
2009-03
Section URL ID
CEPS
Paper Number
183
URL
https://gceps.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/183ashenfelter.pdf
File Function
Jel
D420, G340, K210, L120, L400
Keyword(s)
Corporate mergers, antitrust enforcement
Suppress
false
Series
3